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WHAT’S	 NEW	 FOR	 POLICE	 IN	 
THE	 LIBRARY
The Justice  Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
The active reader:  strategies for academic 
reading and writing.
Eric Henderson.
Don Mills, ON: OUP Canada, 2011, c2012.
PE 1408 H385 2012
Aggression [videorecording].
VEA
Burnaby, BC: Distribution Access [distributor], 
c2013.
1 videodisc (22 min.) : sd., col. ; 4 3/4 in. (DVD)
Are all people capable of murder? What drives 
people to violence?  Can TV affect our actions and 
even influence us to acts of violence? This  
interview-led documentary  style program examines 
aggressive  media, aggressive behaviour and the 
banality of evil with the  support of original film 
footage of research and actual crimes. This program 
features research psychologis ts providing 
explanations and reasoning behind aggression.
BF 575 A3 A34 2013 D1841
Doing qualitative research.
David Silverman.
London, UK; Thousand Oaks, CA; New Delhi; 
Singapore: SAGE Publications Ltd, c2013.
H 62 S472 2013
E-tivities: the key to active online learning.
Gilly Salmon.
New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 
c2013.
LB 1044.87 S25 2013
Exploring  digital libraries: foundations, practice, 
prospects.
Karen Calhoun.
London, UK: Facet Publishing, c2014.
ZA 4080 C35 2014
Getting  control  of yourself:  anger management 
tools & techniques.
with Christian Conte, Ph.D.
Mill Valley CA: Psychotherapy.net, c2012.
1 videodisc (75 minutes);  4 3/4 in. (DVD) + 1 instructor's 
manual (52 pages ; 18 cm)
Instructor's manual by Katie Read, MFT.
RC 569.5 A53 G47 2012 D1838
HBR guide to persuasive presentations.
Nancy Duarte.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, c2012.
HF 5718.22 D817 2012
The little book of stress relief.
David Posen.
Buffalo, NY: Firefly Books, c2012.
RA 785 P67 2012
Managing  business ethics: straight talk about how 
to do it right.
Linda Klebe Treviño, Katherine A. Nelson.
New York, NY: John Wiley, c2011.
HF 5387 T734 2011  
Mediating employment disputes.
Barry Kuretzky, Jennifer MacKenzie.
Toronto, ON: Canada Law Book, c2013.
KE 3206 K87 2013
Successful writing at work.
Philip C. Kolin.
Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, c2013.
PE 1408 K694 2013
Teaching  in  blended learning  environments: 
creating and sustaining communities of inquiry.
Norman D. Vaughan, Martha Cleveland-Innes, and 
D. Randy Garrison.
Edmonton, AB: AU Press, c2013.
LB 2395.7 V39 2013www.10-8.ca
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DETENTION	 JUSTIFIED:
CLEAR	 NEXUS	 BETWEEN	 
DETAINEE	 &	 CRIME
R. v. Witvoet, 2014 ABCA 77
 
Following  the theft of a cube van, its 
owner and his employee were able 
to locate it by following  its tire tracks 
in the newly  fallen snow. They called 
police with its location. A police dog 
followed a set of fresh footprints in the snow for 12 
minutes. The track went from the van to a house. 
They saw a woman stick her head out the side door 
of the house and, after noticing  police, she quickly 
popped back in again. Suspicious, the two officers 
approached the house and spoke to a man (Witvoet) 
and the woman (Davis). They asked them who they 
were, whether they lived there  and whether they 
owned the home. Receiving  no response, the officers 
became more suspicious. After being  told they were 
detained for the stolen vehicle, the man started to 
flee down the stairs of the house followed by the 
woman. When threatened with the police dog, 
Witvoet came out of the house.
 “City Police, stop right there, 
I’m sending in the dog”
 
Concerned that this might be a fresh break and enter 
or possibly an interrupted home invasion – as there 
had been about 20 in the city over the last three 
months – one of the officers followed Davis down 
the stairs as she disappeared from sight. At the 
bottom of the stairs the officer saw the woman try to 
close a door to a room. He asked her who was in the 
room and she responded, “No one.” When the 
officer went into the room he saw another man 
hiding  in a closet with two shotguns within easy 
reach, along  with numerous other weapons and 
ammunition. After back up  arrived the man in the 
basement was taken into custody. A search warrant 
for the house was subsequently obtained and over 
100 stolen items and numerous weapons were 
seized. Both accused Witvoet and Davis lived in the 
basement suite. The other man did not.
 
Alberta Provincial Court
 
Both accused argued, among  other things, 
that their ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights had 
been breached. They sought the exclusion 
of evidence seized by police  under s. 24
(2). The judge ruled that the  police had reasonable 
grounds to suspect the two were criminally 
implicated in the stolen vehicle investigation. Thus, 
they had not been arbitrarily detained under s.9:
 
Given the fact that police had tracked a set of 
footprints in the freshly fallen snow, directly 
from a stolen vehicle to the door of the 
residence of the accused, it is the Court’s 
conclusion that at that point the officer had 
authority to detain the accused Davis for 
investigative purposes at the threshold of the 
residence.  The police also had the power to 
detain for investigative purposes, the accused 
Witvoet at the door to the residence. At this 
juncture both officers were lawfully investigating 
the criminal offence of theft of a motor vehicle 
and they had properly tracked footprints from 
the stolen vehicle directly to the door of the 
residence.  The officers were entitled to detain 
the accused Davis and Witvoet at the threshold 
of their residence for investigative purposes. [see 
2012 ABPC 125, at para. 20]
 
The judge did, however, conclude that the 
warrantless entry into the house infringed s. 8. The 
belief that a home invasion was in progress was 
unreasonable and merely a hunch. There was no 
evidentiary foundation to support the concern of a 
potential home invasion in progress nor a break and 
enter. When the information obtained from the 
warrantless entry was then excised from the ITO, the 
judge held there were no reasonable grounds to 
support the search warrant. She did, however, admit 
the evidence under s. 24(2). The police  acted in 
good faith despite acting  on a hunch. Convictions of 
unauthorized possession of two shotguns, careless 
storage, possession of a weapon obtained by crime 
and seven counts of possession of stolen property 
followed. Davis was also convicted on two counts of 
possessing a weapon contrary to an order.
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Alberta Court of Appeal
 
The accused appealed their 
convictions arguing, in part, that 
the judge erred in not finding  a  s. 9 
Char te r b reach and by not 
excluding the evidence under s. 24(2).
 
Detention
 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge 
did not err in determining  that s. 9 was not 
breached. “[T]here  was a clear nexus between the 
investigative detention of the [accused] and the 
recent criminal activity, namely, the theft of the cube 
van and the set of footprints clearly  leading  from the 
stolen vehicle, now abandoned, to the residence 
where  the [accused’s] were living,” said the Appeal 
Court.
 
s. 24(2) Charter
 
The accused submitted that the police were not 
acting  in good faith because the trial judge found 
their belief that a home invasion was in progress 
unreasonable and supported merely by a hunch. But 
the Court of Appeal disagreed. Although the trial 
judge found that the officers’ belief in a home 
invasion was not reasonable, she did not find the 
concern about a home invasion was simply a pretext 
for entering  the house. “What the trial judge 
described as a hunch arose in circumstances where 
clearly the van had been stolen by someone in the 
house, the two people in the house refused to 
respond to innocuous questions, and they moved 
away from the peace officers after being  advised 
they were being  detained for the theft of the van,” 
said the Appeal Court. “Even if the precise nature of 
the peace officers’ concerns were not well founded, 
their suspicions were reasonable in those 
circumstances, and sufficient to support the  trial 
judge’s conclusion that they acted in good faith.” 
Other 24(2) submissions were rejected. The Court of 
Appeal concluded that the trial judge did not 
improperly apply the principles or rules regarding  a 
s. 24(2) admissibility analysis nor did she  make 
unreasonable findings. She was owed deference  and 
the appeals were dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
SEARCH	 OF	 TRUNK	 LAWFUL:	 
ODOUR	 +	 OTHER	 FACTORS	 =	 
REASONABLE	 GROUNDS
R. v. Valentine, 2014 ONCA 147
 
After being  stopped for speeding  at 
10:20 pm, the accused appeared to 
be inordinately nervous as the 
officer obtained his driver’s licence, 
registration and insurance. A CPIC 
check revealed he was on bail for assault and 
uttering  threats, and had a curfew which prohibited 
him from being  outside his residence between 10 
pm and 5 am.  CPIC also flagged him for violence 
and as an escape  risk.  When officers approached 
him and said he was under arrest for breaching  his 
bail, the accused became uncooperative and refused 
to get out of the car. He was physically removed, 
arrested and frisked. Police  located a cellphone and 
then placed the  accused in the back of the police 
car. The officer, unsure if he was going  to release the 
accused at the scene, decided to search the car. He 
was worried there might be weapons in it that the 
accused could access if he was released. 
When the officer put his head in the car to begin his 
search he smelled a  strong  odour of marihuana. He 
also saw a second cellphone and a large amount of 
cash in a jacket that was lying  across the  passenger 
seat. The officer, believing  the accused possessed 
marihuana, returned to his police car and arrested 
him for possession. The officer then searched the 
accused’s vehicle incidental to the marihuana 
possession arrest. A large partially-open duffle bag 
containing  nine vaccuum-sealed cylinders holding 
18  pounds of marihuana was found in the trunk. The 
officer could smell marihuana coming  from the 
cylinders and noted the duffle bag  also gave off the 
heavy smell of marihuana. The car was towed to the 
police station where it was examined by two other 
officers, both smelling  a strong  odour of marihuana 
coming from it. 
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused challenged the whether the 
the search was reasonable under s. 8  of 
the Charter by arguing  that the officer 
could not have smelled marihuana when 
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he conducted his safety search in the front of the car. 
The accused said he vacuum-sealed the marihuana 
in plastic and placed it in a water-resistant duffle bag 
to mask its smell. As well, he said he would 
periodically open the car window to circulate the air 
and conduct smell tests to ensure the marihuana was 
not giving  off any noticeable odour. The accused 
also called an expert who testified about the 
olfactory ability of humans, the odour containment 
properties of packaging  and the smell characteristics 
of raw marihuana.  After conducting  his own tests, 
the expert opined that the officers’ evidence that 
they could smell raw marihuana in the car was 
simply not credible. 
Using  a progressive analysis of the police interaction 
with the accused, the judge concluded that the 
police stayed within their authority as the situation 
developed. The judge first ruled that the officer had 
the authority to stop the accused under both the 
common law and Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act to 
obtain relevant documents, such as a driver’s 
licence, and to perform the CPIC search. The CPIC 
information then provided reasonable grounds, both 
subjective and objective, for the breach of 
recognizance arrest. The search of the area 
proximate to the driver’s seat was proper as a search 
incident to the arrest on the breach charge because 
the officer was considering  releasing  the accused 
and he was concerned that, if he did so, police 
safety could be  in jeopardy if there were weapons in 
the area around the driver’s seat. The possession 
arrest was also lawful because the officer smelled 
raw marihuana and discovered another cell phone 
and a large amount of cash. The search of the entire 
car incident to the possession charge, which led to 
the discovery of the large quantity of marihuana, 
was also a valid search.  There were no Charter 
breaches and, even if there were, the evidence was 
admissible under s. 24(2). The accused was 
convicted of possessing  marihuana for the purpose 
of trafficking.
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused argued that his s. 8 
Charter right was infringed and 
that the evidence ought to have 
been excluded under s. 24(2). 
Arrest - Breach of Recognizance
The accused suggested that the arrest for the curfew 
breach was not based on reasonable  grounds 
because  the  officer knew the accused had an 
employment exception to his curfew. CPIC indicated 
such and the accused said he told the officer that he 
had a letter from his employer giving  him permission 
to be  outside of his home at that time. Justice 
Epstein, however, disagreed. The officer had 
subjectively believed the accused was in breach - he 
was stopped out past his curfew - and his grounds 
were objectively reasonable. The officer only had the 
accused’s assurance he was allowed to be out at 
night:
It is true that there was an employment 
exception and the evidence demonstrates that 
[the arresting officer] became aware of it, at least 
through his exchange with CPIC.   However, on 
its own, the officer’s knowing  about the 
employment exception does not necessarily lead 
to the conclusion that his belief that the 
[accused] was in breach of his recognizance was 
unreasonable. Determining whether the 
employment exception operated at that 
particular time and in those particular 
circumstances depended on obtaining additional 
information about the circumstances in which 
the [accused] was driving along Highway 401 
late at night and then assessing the validity of 
that information. 
... It was late at night.  The [accused] had serious 
criminal antecedents, was on bail for serious 
offences and was exhibiting threatening 
behaviour. In my view in these circumstances 
the officer is not required to investigate and try 
to rule out all possible explanations for the 
[accused’s] being out past his curfew before 
making an arrest. [paras. 39-40]
Safety Search - Front of the Car 
The warrantless search of area in the front of the car 
incident to the accused’s arrest was also lawful. “A 
search incident to arrest is only valid if it is 
conducted for a legitimate purpose,” said Justice 
Epstein. “The three main purposes of a search 
incident to arrest are to ensure the safety of the 
police and the public, to protect evidence from 
destruction and to discover evidence that may be 
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used at trial.” Here, the officer said he searched the 
vehicle for safety reasons. The accused, on the other 
hand, contended the search was not done for a valid 
objective. In his view, the officer safety reason was 
illogical since he was confined in the back of a 
police cruiser and therefore police safety could not 
have possibly been in jeopardy. Again, the Court of 
Appeal disagreed.  The trial judge found that the 
officer’s concern in allowing  the accused back into 
the car if he were released would give  rise to an 
officer safety concern based on the possibility that 
there  may be weapons in the car proximate to the 
driver’s seat. This concern was valid in the light of 
the accused’s criminal antecedents and the 
disturbing  behaviour he had exhibited in the course 
of the stop.   
Arrest - Possession of Marihuana
The Court of Appeal also rejected the accused’s 
submission that the  officer could not smell 
marihuana in the course  of the safety search. The 
trial judge accepted the officer’s testimony that he 
could smell raw marihuana in the car and rejected 
the expert’s evidence. The odour of raw marihuana, 
along  with the cash, a  second cell phone and the 
accused’s behaviour during  the interaction, provided 
the necessary grounds for the possession arrest. 
Evidence Search - the Car 
The arrest for possession of marihuana entitled 
police to search the rest of the car, including  the 
trunk, to obtain further evidence of the offence. “As 
[the officer] carried out the search for the legitimate 
purpose of discovering  evidence connected to the 
arrest for possession, it was a lawful search incident 
to arrest,” said Justice  Epstein. The search of the 
trunk did not breach s. 8  of the  Charter and there 
was no reason to consider s. 24(2).
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
OFFICERS	 CIVILLY	 PROTECTED	 
BY	 REASONABLE	 MISTAKE	 OF	 
FACT
Tymkin v. Ewatski et al., 2014 MBCA 4
Police officers attended the plaintiff’s 
residence in the middle of the night 
to arrest him after his recently-
separated wife made an allegation of 
domestic assault which occurred 
some two months earlier. They knocked on his door 
and an occupant (not the plaintiff)  answered. 
Officers told this occupant that they were there to 
arrest the plaintiff and asked whether he was 
present. When the occupant confirmed that the 
plaintiff was home, police  asked him to go and get 
the plaintiff. The police also asked if they could enter 
and wait while  the occupant went to get the plaintiff. 
He gave  the officers permission to enter into the 
doorway of the dwelling. The officers believed that 
the occupant had the authority to allow them to 
enter into the doorway. The officers never left the 
doorway and waited for the plaintiff to attend. When 
the plaintiff presented himself the police arrested 
him for domestic assault, advised him of his Charter 
rights, handcuffed him and took him to the police 
station where he  was released on a recognizance. As 
it turned out, the  occupant who answered the door 
was an overnight guest. The plaintiff was charged 
with assault which was subsequently  stayed. He then 
sued police for malicious prosecution, false 
imprisonment and battery. 
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
A jury found the arresting  officer had the 
necessary  subjective belief to arrest the 
plaintiff and that he was preventing 
another incident against the  complainant 
in doing  so. As for the entry, the jury concluded that 
the person answering  the door gave the police 
permission to come in and that the officer thought 
this person had the right to do so.  The jury also held 
that the handcuffs were not placed too tightly  nor 
was excessive force used. Based on these factual 
findings by the jury, the  judge found the police 
officers’ subjective beliefs were objectively 
reasonable and the plaintiff’s warrantless arrest in his 
dwelling  was lawful. The police had been given 
“The three main purposes of a search 
incident to arrest are to ensure the safety 
of the police and the public, to protect 
evidence from destruction and to discover 
evidence that may be used at trial.”
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consent to enter by the overnight guest who knew 
why the police were there and helped them by 
getting  the plaintiff. Furthermore, even if the consent 
was not valid, the officers were nonetheless 
protected from civil liability under s. 25(1)(b) of the 
Criminal Code  because their error would have been 
a reasonable mistake of fact. "[I]t's late at night, the 
person answering  the door was just woken up, one 
can be excused for thinking  that the person has 
authority," said the judge. He held that this mistake 
of fact, which was reasonable in the circumstances, 
triggered s. 25(1) protection. The  jury awarded 
provisional damages of $0. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The plaintiff brought forth an 
appeal submitting, in part, that the 
trial judge erred in concluding 
that the warrantless arrest was 
lawful because police believed they had permission 
to enter by someone with the authority to give it. 
At common law, the occupant of a residence gives 
an implied licence to members of the public, which 
includes police officers, to approach the door of a 
dwelling  and knock in order to communicate with 
the occupant(s). Provided the approach is for a 
lawful purpose, such as communicating  with the 
occupant for the  specific purpose of arrest, there is 
no trespass. However, since the police did not have 
an entry warrant to effect the arrest, the could not 
enter the dwelling  without first obtaining  the 
informed consent from a person having  a  reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the house. 
Justice Chartier, writing  the majority opinion, 
concluded that even if the overnight guest did not 
have a sufficient privacy interest in the dwelling  to 
grant permission to the police officers to enter 
(which rendered the arrest unlawful), the police 
officers were nonetheless protected under s. 25(1):
[T]he police officers were aware that they 
required consent before entering into the 
dwelling. There was no misapprehension of the 
law on the part of the police officers. They were 
not acting  on some unreasonable mistaken belief 
that no consent was required. They sought and 
obtained consent from a person with ostensible 
authority. [para. 124]
This was not a  case where the police were mistaken 
in their belief that they could lawfully enter the 
dwelling  without any consent at all. Had they 
believed that they could enter without consent, that 
belief would have been a mistake of law and would 
not have protected them from civil liability. 
However, the trial judge ruled that the police 
officers' subjective  beliefs that they had the informed 
consent to enter the  home and stay  in the doorway 
from a person with apparent authority to allow it 
was objectively reasonable. Justice Chartier 
concluded the trial judge did not err in this regard:
In this case, ... an occupant of the house, who 
visibly had been awoken from his sleep, was 
told by police officers that they were there to 
arrest the plaintiff and he gave them authority to 
enter. They had clearly received ostensible 
authorization to enter, or, ... they had received 
"authorization to trespass" into the doorway of 
the dwelling. This was not a mistaken belief on 
the part of the police officers as to the state of 
“The test for s. 25(1) protection is not whether the police officers had the required 
consent to enter the dwelling to arrest, but whether they had ‘reasonable grounds’ to 
believe they had the required consent to enter.”
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal	 Code: Protection of Persons Acting 
Under Authority
s.25 (1)  Every one who is required or 
authorized by law to do anything  in 
the administration or enforcement of 
the law
(b) as a peace officer or public officer,
is, if he acts on reasonable grounds, justified in 
doing  what he is required or authorized to do and 
in using  as much force as is necessary for that 
purpose.
... ... ...
... ... ...
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the law with respect to the need for consent. 
[references omitted, para. 126]
And further:
It is important to recall the wording  of s. 25(1). 
The test for s. 25(1) protection is not whether the 
police officers had the required consent to enter 
the dwelling  to arrest, but whether they had 
"reasonable grounds" to believe they had the 
required consent to enter. ...[A]s long as the 
police officers' mistake was one of fact, if they 
"reasonably believed that they had consent to 
enter the [dwelling], this would give them a 
defence under s. 25(1) even if, in fact, they had 
no consent". 
As stated above, s. 25(1) protection can also 
only be triggered if the police officers' mistake 
was one of fact, not law. In this case, the trial 
judge found that the police officers made a 
reasonable mistake of fact. ... The question with 
respect to the authority to arrest in the house 
turned on whether the consent given was a valid 
one "sufficient" to allow entry. The question of 
the availability of the s. 25(1) protection turned 
on whether the police officers' mistake was a 
"reasonable" mistake of fact. In my view, the 
issues of fact and law in those two questions 
cannot be entirely disentangled from each other. 
Whenever a quest ion raises issues of 
"sufficiency" or "reasonableness," it typically 
involves a consideration and review of the facts 
of the case. In the context of a civil case, such as 
here, those questions would not be questions of 
law. As a result, I am of the view that the trial 
judge did not err when he found that the police 
officers' mistake, in this case, was a reasonable 
mistake of fact, not a mistake on a question of 
law. [references omitted, para. 131-132]
The majority agreed with the  trial judge's finding 
that the  police officers' mistake of fact was 
reasonable in the circumstances and that they were 
entitled to the protection offered by s. 25(1).
A Different View
Justice Monnin, authoring  a dissenting 
opinion, agreed that the trial judge did not 
err in finding  that the police officers’ 
personally held grounds for belief were 
objectively reasonable and therefor the plaintiff 
could be arrested. However, he concluded that the 
police did not have the informed consent to enter 
the dwelling  from a person with the authority to 
grant access. Although the police generally must 
obtain an entry warrant to effect an arrest in a 
dwelling  house, there are  some exceptions such as 
valid consent, which must be properly informed and 
obtained from someone having  a privacy interest in 
the home (not necessarily the target of the arrest). In 
this case, the purported consent was offered by an 
overnight guest who, in Justice Monnin’s view, was 
not a person with a  reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the residence. “The police were attending 
the premises not for an investigatory purpose but 
with the clear intention of arresting  the plaintiff,” he 
said. “In order to gain entry and to effect an arrest 
without a warrant, they had to obtain the informed 
consent of an individual with a sufficient privacy 
interest to allow them to do so. The evidence is that 
they did not do so. They did not receive consent, let 
alone an informed consent, from such an individual 
and consequently ... the  plaintiff's arrest was 
unlawful.”
As for the protections afforded under s. 25(1), they 
did not apply because the police did not have the 
authority to arrest the plaintiff within the residence. 
“[S]ince there  was no warrant, the only authority to 
arrest within the dwelling  must have arisen from the 
consent.,” said Justice Monnin. “If there was no valid 
consent, except in the minds of the police officers, 
the mistaken belief is in fact being  used to cloak the 
police officers with the requisite  authority. That is 
legal boot-strapping.” Without the lawful authority to 
arrest within the dwelling, s. 25(1)  did not apply, 
even if based upon a mistake of fact. Justice Monnin 
found the trial judge erred in law with respect to the 
lawfulness of the arrest within the dwelling  and the 
false imprisonment and battery actions should have 
been successful. He would have awarded nominal 
damages of $1 and court costs to the plaintiff. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
www.10-8.ca
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CONSENT	 RELEVANT	 TO	 
LAWFULNESS	 OF	 WARRANTLESS	 
DWELLING	 ARREST
Land v. Law Enforcement Review Board, 
2013 ABCA 435
 
Two police officers arrested a 19-year-
old man for allegedly  punching  his 
girlfriend in the stomach. The man 
was released on an assault charge 
with a condition that he have no 
contact with his girlfriend pending  trial. About a 
month later, having  received information that the 
man was maintaining  contact with his girlfriend, 
officers went to his residence to arrest him for 
breaching  his recognizance’s no-contact condition. 
Police entered the residence, retrieved the man and 
placed him under arrest. During  the arrest, the man’s 
mother made a motion to shield her son from police, 
which resulted in her being  charged with obstructing 
a peace officer in the execution of their duties. 
A subsequent complaint against the police alleged 
that the officers unlawfully entered the residence, 
improperly applied force to the mother, and used 
profane, abusive and discriminatory language. Two 
officers were charged under Alberta’s Police Service 
Regulation  with, among  other allegations, entering  a 
residence without proper authorization. 
 
Chief of Police
Following  a disciplinary hearing, the 
Pres iding  Off icer focused on the 
lawfulness of the officers’ entry into the 
residence and suggested that the issue 
came down to consent. If the  mother 
consented to police entry, then the arrest 
was lawful and the officers’ actions were justified. 
There was conflicting  evidence. The mother 
contended that the  officers rang  the doorbell, forced 
their way into the residence and refused to show a 
warrant despite repeated requests. She said she 
asked the officers to leave but they stayed and 
arrested her son. The officers said the mother invited 
them into the residence. They informed her why they 
were there and she only asked them to leave after 
her son was arrested. The Presiding  Officer found 
that the allegation that the officers entered the house 
unlawfully or made an unlawful arrest were not 
made out. The Presenting  Officer had failed to prove 
the offences on a balance of probabilities. The 
charges were dismissed.
Alberta Law Enforcement Review Board
The complainant appealed the 
Presiding  Officer’s decision to the 
Law Enforcement Review Board 
(LERB). The LERB reversed the 
Presiding  Officer’s decision, in part, by finding  the 
officers guilty of unlawful or unnecessary exercise of 
authority. The LERB held that the officers had no 
lawful authority to arrest without a  warrant 
anywhere, even had the man been on the street. The 
LERB opined that offences falling  under s 495(2) of 
the Criminal Code do not allow police to arrest 
without a warrant absent satisfying  certain criteria. 
Since a breach of recognizance is a  hybrid offence a 
warrant was needed to arrest the man because the s. 
495(2) criteria were not satisfied. Since there was no 
arrest warrant, the entry into the  house and the arrest 
were unlawful and their attempts to control the 
mother constituted “an unnecessary exercise of 
authority.” The LERB found the allegations of 
entering  the residence without proper authorization 
and remaining  inside after being  requested to leave 
were proven.  
Alberta Court of Appeal
The officers appealed the LERB’s 
ruling  by arguing, among  other 
things, that the LERB erred in 
concluding  that the police had no 
authority to arrest without a warrant and that the 
arrest was not otherwise justified. They wanted the 
Presiding  Officer’s findings of no misconduct 
reinstated. The officers suggested that the LERB failed  
to consider s. 524(2)  of the Criminal Code which, in 
their view, would not have required a warrant to 
arrest the man on the street for breaching  a 
recognizance. 
The Court of Appeal found the LERB was mistaken in 
holding  that a warrant was required to arrest the 
man on the street. However, the arrest was not made 
on the street but rather in a residence. 
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Making  an arrest in a dwelling  house generally 
requires a warrant to enter even if the police have 
the power to arrest under ss. 495(1)  or 524(2) of the 
Criminal Code. Absent an exception, such as hot 
pursuit or exigent circumstances, the police require 
a warrant to enter for the purpose of arresting  a 
person in their home for breach of recognizance. A 
warrantless arrest in a private residence may also be 
lawful where the  police are authorized by the 
homeowner to enter and remain inside. 
In this case, the LERB did not explicitly consider 
lack of consent as a necessary component to 
unlawful arrest. This failing  was an err in law. The 
charges against the officer spoke to lawfulness and it 
was incumbent upon the LERB to consider all 
elements of unlawful arrest, which included the lack 
of consent. Since the LERB failed to consider s. 524
(2)  of the Criminal Code and the issue of consent as 
part of the test in determining  whether the arrest was 
unlawful, the matter was remitted back to the  LERB 
for further consideration. Justice Conrad, writing  a 
dissenting  opinion on other matters, agreed with the 
majority decision on the issue of consent. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
YOUTH	 NOT	 DETAINED:	 
s.	 146	 YCJA	 DID	 NOT	 APPLY
R. v. Todorovic, 2014 ONCA 153
 
Police knew that the accused’s 
boyfriend had killed a 14-year-old 
victim. They also knew about an 
incident some three months earlier 
alleging  the accused told her 
boyfriend that she  wanted him to stab  the  victim. As 
part of the murder investigation, an officer called the 
accused’s mother, told her that there had been an 
incident and that the police wanted to speak to the 
accused. He asked the mother to bring  the accused 
to the station. Before the video-taped interview, the 
police gave the accused a K.G.B. warning, as they 
had with other witnesses. She was told the 
following:
Nobody can force you to make a statement. This door 
is only, will, will be closed but it’s not locked. All right? 
You’re not, you’re not here under arrest all right? Do 
you understand your right to choose whether or not to 
make a statement. 
The accused replied in the affirmative and agreed to 
give a statement. She was then placed under oath 
and an interview started at 3:05 am. This interview 
terminated when the accused made an incriminating 
statement to the effect that she had asked her 
boyfriend to kill the victim. She was left alone in an 
interview room for several hours, spoke to duty 
counsel and was explained her rights under s. 146 
of the  Youth Criminal Justice  Act (YCJA). She said she 
wanted her mother present. Her mother returned to 
the police station and the questioning  began after s. 
146  rights were once again explained. The accused 
waived her right to have a lawyer present.
Ontario Superior Court
The Crown sought to introduce the 
accused’s 3:05 am statement, among 
other evidence. The Crown argued that 
the accused was not detained during  the 
interview until she made a specific incriminating 
statement at which point the interview ended. Thus, 
s. 146 YCJA did not apply to that statement. The 
accused, on the other hand, submitted that the 
statement was inadmissible because the police  did 
not comply with s. 146.  
The judge found that the accused and her mother 
were contacted by a police officer. In response, they 
freely came to the police station to assist with the 
investigation. Once at the station, the investigating 
officers told the accused and her mother that while 
the door to the interview room was shut, it was not 
locked and that she was not under arrest. As well, 
the officers told the accused she was not obliged to 
give a statement. The judge also concluded that the 
police did not have reasonable grounds to believe 
the accused committed an offence until her 
admission at the very end of the interview. The 
police believed she was an important witness, not a 
suspect. As a result of the accused’s statements and 
other circumstantial evidence she was convicted of 
first degree murder and sentenced as an adult to life 
imprisonment without eligibility for parole for seven 
years. 
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Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused challenged her 
conviction, again arguing  that she 
was detained during  the 3:05 
interview within the meaning  of s. 
146(2) of the YCJA. She also submitted that before 
she made the incriminating  statement at the end of 
the interview, the officer had reasonable grounds to 
believe that she had committed an offence which 
itself triggered s. 146(2). 
Section 146(2)  requires that the police provide  a 
young  person with information and rights beyond 
those provided under common law or under s. 10 of 
the Charter if the  young  person is under arrest or 
detention, or the officer has reasonable grounds for 
believing  that the young  person has committed an 
offence. 
Detention
Using  ss. 8 and 9 Charter jurisprudence to define the 
meaning  of detention for the  purposes of s. 146(2), 
Justice Rosenberg, authoring  the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, noted that the accused had no legal 
obligation to comply with the officer’s request to 
attend the police station. Thus, the  question became 
whether the circumstances in this case amounted to 
psychological detention. It was the accused’s view 
that the officer’s request was a demand or direction 
and a reasonable person in her circumstances would 
conclude that there was no choice but to comply. 
She also contended that it was never made clear to 
her that she  could leave at any time. The Crown, on 
the other hand, maintained that the accused was not 
detained until the specific incriminating  statement 
was made at which point the interview ended and 
police complied with s. 146 before taking  another 
statement. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the  trial 
judge that there  was no demand or direction 
amounting  to a psychological detention arising  from 
the police request for the accused to attend the 
police station. The accused and her mother freely 
attended, the mother wanted to assist the police in 
what ever way she and her daughter could, and her 
actions and statements at the time did not suggest 
BY THE BOOK:
Youth Criminal Justice Act: s. 146(2)
When Statements Are Admissible 
s.  146 (2) No oral or written statement made 
by a young  person who is less than eighteen 
years old, to a peace officer or to any other 
person who is, in law, a person in authority, 
on the arrest or detention of the young 
person or in circumstances where the peace officer or 
other person has reasonable grounds for believing  that the 
young  person has committed  an offence is admissible 
against the young person unless
(b)  the person to whom the statement was made has, 
before the statement  was made, clearly explained to the 
young  person, in language appropriate to his or her age 
and understanding, that
(i) the young  person is under no obligation to make a 
statement,
(ii) any statement made by the young  person may be used 
as evidence in proceedings against him or her,
(iii) the young  person has the right to consult counsel and  a 
parent or other person in accordance with paragraph (c), 
and
(iv) any statement made by the young  person is required  to 
be made in the presence of  counsel and any other person 
consulted  in accordance with paragraph (c),  if any, unless 
the young person desires otherwise;
(c)  the young  person has, before the statement was made, 
been given a reasonable opportunity to consult
(i) with counsel, and
(ii)  with a parent or, in the absence of a parent, an adult 
relative or, in the absence of a parent and an adult relative, 
any other appropriate adult chosen by the young  person, as 
long  as that person is not a co-accused, or under 
investigation, in respect of the same offence; and
(d)  if the young  person consults a person in accordance 
with paragraph (c), the young  person has been given a 
reasonable  opportunity to make the statement in the 
presence of that person.
... ... ...
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she had no choice but to attend the station. Nor was 
there  a detention when the accused and her mother 
were placed in the interview room and the door 
was closed. Justice Rosenberg stated:
The door was closed, but the [accused] and her 
mother were told that the door was not locked. 
While they were not told explicitly that they 
could leave at any time, they were told that 
nobody could force the [accused] to make a 
statement and that she was not under arrest. The 
[accused] agreed that she understood she had 
the right to choose whether or not to make a 
statement. It was not necessary for the officers to 
expressly tell the [accused] that she could leave 
at any time. The only reason she was there was 
to make a statement. If she chose not to make a 
statement there was no reason for her to remain. 
[para. 17]
Reasonable Ground to Believe the Accused 
Committed an Offence
The accused also submitted that the investigating 
officers had reasonable grounds to believe that she 
had committed an offence (party to the murder)  and 
therefore s. 146(2) applied at the time of the 3:05 am 
interview. But again, the Court of Appeal found the 
trial judge’s decision was supported by the evidence. 
The officers only had reasonable grounds to believe 
the accused was a party to the offence much later in 
the interview. When the accused acknowledged she 
asked the suspect to kill the victim, s. 146  was then 
triggered and the police properly broke off the 
interview, advised the accused of her rights and gave 
her the opportunity to speak to duty counsel.       
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
STAY	 UNWARRANTED:	 NO	 NEXUS	 
BETWEEN	 POST-INVESTIGATION	 
CHARTER	 BREACH	 &	 OFFENCES
R. v. Poletz, 2014 SKCA 16
Police officers who were patrolling  a 
country music jamboree attended by 
20,000+ people received instructions 
from a supervisor to ensure that all 
vehicles in the campground were 
parked for the night as there were concerns for the 
safety of the public walking  around the area. At 
about 8:30 pm the officers observed a truck slowly 
navigating  through a large crowd of jamboree 
attendees. The officers pulled the vehicle over and 
the accused was arrested for impaired driving. Open 
liquor was also found in the truck. He was taken to 
the police station and held for 12 hours after he 
provided breath samples of 180mg% and 170mg%. 
He was charged with impaired driving, over 80mg% 
and open liquor in a vehicle under Saskatchewan's 
Alcohol and Gaming Regulation Act.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
Th e j u d g e c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e 
circumstances of the accused’s arrest had 
resulted in four separate Charter 
breaches. First, the judge found the 
accused had been arbitrarily  detained under s. 9. He 
found the officers decision to stop  the  accused was 
not related to highway safety and therefore the 
detention powers under s. 209.1 of Saskatchewan’s 
Traffic Safety Act did not apply. Nor was there any 
evidence to suggest the officers had any grounds to 
believe the accused was involved in criminal activity 
before the stop. Rather, the  pull over was aimed at 
enforcing  a curfew and discouraging  vehicle 
movement in the campground area. Second, the 
judge ruled that the officer making  the breath 
demand did not have sufficient grounds to do so, 
thus resulting  in an unreasonable seizure  of his 
breath samples (a s. 8 breach). Third, the police 
denied the accused his right to consult counsel 
under s. 10(b). The police pushed the accused into 
speaking  with Legal Aid duty counsel and did not 
allow him to contact a lawyer of his choice. Finally, 
the judge found the accused was subject to an 
Charter
s. 8 Everyone has the right to be secure against 
unreasonable search or seizure.
s. 9 Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained or imprisoned.
s. 10(b) Everyone has the right on arrest or 
detention ... (b) to retain and instruct counsel 
without delay and to be informed of that right.
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additional arbitrary detention under s. 9 when he 
was unnecessarily  held for 12 hours. In the judge’s 
view, the police should have tried to find or allowed 
the accused an opportunity to find someone to take 
care of him.
The judge found the three investigatory breaches 
(i.e., the stop, the arrest and the right to counsel) did 
not warrant the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) 
of the Charter. The Certificate of Analyses was 
admitted and the accused was convicted of driving 
while over 80 mg% and for having  open liquor in 
his vehicle. However, the judge concluded that the 
12 hour post-investigation detention warranted a 
stay of proceedings because the police were acting 
out of “reasons of convenience and/or lack of 
resources.” This was one of “the clearest of cases” for 
a stay and there was no other appropriate or just 
remedy in the circumstances. A stay of proceedings 
would not only redress the past wrong  (the arbitrary 
detention), but would serve to prevent a 
perpetuation of such arbitrary detentions in the 
future and encourage the  police to comply  with ss. 
497 and 498 of the Criminal Code.
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
Both the Crown and the accused 
appealed. The Crown challenged the trial 
judge’s findings of the Charter breaches 
and his imposition of the stay of 
proceedings. The accused, on the other hand, 
wanted the Certificate  of Analyses excluded as 
evidence. 
Even though the appeal judge might not have arrived 
at the same conclusions on the Charter breaches, he 
did not interfere with the trial judge’s findings 
because  there was evidence which was “reasonably 
capable” of supporting  them. The appeal judge also 
ruled the trial judge had correctly applied the law in 
admitting  the Certificate of Analyses into evidence in 
spite of the three investigatory breaches. However, 
the appeal judge set aside the stay as a remedy for 
the post-investigation s. 9 breach for arbitrarily 
detaining  the accused for 12 hours following  the 
conclusion of the police investigation. In his view, 
there was no connection between the  post-
investigation Charter  breach and the  charges. The 
matter was remitted back  to provincial court for 
sentencing.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused challenged the 
reversal of the stay, arguing  the 
appeal judge erred. But this 
submission was rejected. “There is 
plainly no nexus between the arbitrary detention 
and the conviction of [the accused] on the over 80 
and open liquor charges so as to warrant a stay  of 
the entering  of those convictions,” said Justice 
Caldwell, writing  the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 
Nor did this case warrant a  stay in the absence of a 
nexus because the police misconduct was not so 
egregious that going  forward with the case would be 
offensive. Justice Caldwell continued:
That is to say, because the misconduct here is 
minor and there is no nexus between the 
convictions and the Charter breach in this case, 
the remedy of a stay is, to all appearances, 
entirely out of proportion to the breach and 
could, by its weight, bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. In my opinion, it would 
seem to the public utterly incongruous to have 
properly found [the accused] guilty on the two 
charges he faced only to then stay the entering 
of his convictions on those charges simply 
because the state had held him in detention 
l o n g e r t h a n wa s a p p r o p r i a t e i n t h e 
circumstances where its resources were taxed by 
the policing demands of the Craven Jamboree. 
To the public, this would amount to an acquittal 
in the face of clear, convincing and admissible 
evidence of guilt and would only serve, in the 
circumstances, to itself raise questions as to the 
integrity of the justice system.
“[B]ecause the misconduct here is minor 
and there is no nexus between the 
convictions and the Charter breach in 
this case, the remedy of a stay is, to all 
appearances, entirely out of proportion 
to the breach and could, by its weight, 
bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute.”
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Also, a stay was not the only available remedy. 
The trial judge could have taken the arbitrary 
detention into account in sentencing [the 
accused] on his over 80 and open liquor 
convictions. However, because the charges did 
not contemplate a sentence which included a 
period of incarceration, the available remedies 
here were necessarily limited to a reduction of 
the amount of the fines which the trial judge 
could have imposed upon [the accused]. The 
trial judge acknowledged this, but fell into error 
when he allowed his dissatisfaction with the 
available remedies to persuade him that a stay 
was therefore appropriate in the circumstances. 
[references omitted, paras. 11-12]
And further:
... I conclude the state conduct here does not fall 
into the residual category where a nexus is not 
required because that conduct cannot be said to 
connote “unfairness or vexatiousness of such a 
degree that it contravenes fundamental notions 
of justice and thus undermines the integrity of 
the judicial process”. And, finally, if any doubt 
remained, the third criterion, the traditional 
balancing of interests, heavily tips the scales in 
favour of proceeding to a final decision on the 
merits for the reasons noted above.
More plainly, the 12-hour arbitrary detention did 
not warrant a stay of proceedings because it 
gave rise to no prejudice to [the accused’s] 
ability to make full answer and defence; and, 
given the reasons the trial judge found for its 
occurrence (i.e., “convenience and/or lack of 
resources”, which must be tempered with an 
undertone of practicality in the context of the 
Craven Jamboree), the arbitrary detention could 
but have marginally affected the integrity of the 
justice system, which effect was reasonably 
remediable by a reduction in sentence. 
[reference omitted, para. 15-16]
The remedy of a stay was neither proportionate nor a 
reparative response to the  arbitrary detention and the 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s note: Additional case facts taken from R. v. 
Poletz, 2009 SKPC 121 and 2012 SKQB 148.
MASSAGE	 +	 MASTURBATION	 
AMOUNTED	 TO	 SEX	 ASSAULT
R. v. Bourdon, 2014 ABCA 34
  
The accused, a ch i roprac tor, 
massaged a patient’s back and neck 
with one hand. With his other hand, 
which he tried to hide from his 
patient, he  masturbated. He was 
charged with sexual assault. 
Alberta Provincial Court
The trial judge convicted the accused. 
Although the accused claimed the 
touching  was not of a sexual nature, the 
judge was satisfied that all of the elements 
of sexual assault had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
Alberta Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
conviction arguing  the therapeutic 
massaging  of his patient’s back and 
neck was not of a sexual nature. 
The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed. “A 
deliberate  touching  without consent is an assault,” 
said the Court of Appeal. There was a deliberate 
touching  of the complainant without her consent, 
thus an assault was made out. The accused’s own 
evidence demonstrated that he knew his patient did 
not consent to the treatment with one hand while he 
masturbated with the other. And the assault was for a 
sexual nature. The accused conceded that he was 
sexually  gratifying  himself at the same time he was 
touching the victim. 
The accused’s suggestion that his conduct be parsed 
- therapeutic touching  with the one hand and 
performing  an indecent act with the other - was also 
rejected. “Given that the  two manipulations were 
simultaneous, the trial judge’s finding  that the 
[accused’s] massaging  of his patient’s back and neck 
had sexual gratification as its purpose was not 
unreasonable,” said the Court of Appeal,
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
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HIT	 &	 RUN:	 INTENT	 MUST	 BE	 TO	 
AVOID	 CIVIL	 OR	 CRIMINAL	 
LIABILITY
R. v. Stanton, 2014 ONCA 29
After playing  a  round of golf and 
having  some drinks, the accused was 
driving  on an unfamiliar, tree-lined 
rural road when he hit something  at 
10:30 pm. He believed it was a  deer, 
but it was actually a cyclist that he struck and killed. 
The accused continued home, left his damaged car 
in his driveway and had a cigarette. His friend’s wife 
then drove him back to the area of the impact. The 
police were on the scene and had blocked the road. 
He did not report that he was involved in an 
accident. He returned home and called the police at 
12:40 am to report he had been involved in a 
collision earlier that evening. He was charged with 
failing  to stop at the scene of an accident under s. 
252(1.3) of the Criminal Code.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused conceded that he was 
involved in the accident with the cyclist 
and left the scene without identifying 
himself or assisting  the cyclist. However, 
he testified that he thought he had hit a  deer. The 
Crown called expert evidence from two accident 
reconstruction officers suggesting  that the  accused 
either knew he hit a cyclist or was wilfully blind to 
that fact. The  judge found the accused’s evidence 
rebutted the presumption in s. 252(2)  of the Criminal 
Code. He had raised a reasonable doubt about 
whether he failed to stop with the intention of 
avoiding  civil or criminal liability. The judge also 
found the expert evidence about the mechanics of 
the accident did not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt the accused’s intent, that he could not have 
hit the cyclist without seeing  him or that he was 
willfully blind to that fact. The accused was 
acquitted
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the acquittal 
arguing, in part, that the trial judge 
failed to consider all of the 
evidence relative to the accused’s intent. The Court 
of Appeal, however, disagreed. In this case, the  trial 
judge assessed all of the evidence, including  that of 
the experts, in finding  a reasonable doubt about the 
accused’s intent. She addressed the Crown’s 
submission that the accused must have had 
suspicions he hit a person because of the nature of 
the accident and that his alcohol consumption was a 
reason for fleeing. The trial judge did not err with 
respect to the intent required under s. 252 and the 
Crown’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontrariocourts.on.ca
REASONABLE	 DOUBT	 APPLIED	 
TO	 EVIDENCE	 AS	 A	 WHOLE,	 NOT	 
INDIVIDUAL	 PIECES
R. v. R.B.H., 2014 SKCA 17                    
The police responded to a call that a 
taxi cab driver had been assaulted 
with a knife and bear spray. When 
police cordoned off an area around 
the crime scene they located the 
accused, along  with two other young  men. As an 
officer approached the three young  men he saw the 
accused shove something  down his pants trying  to 
conceal it. The accused denied having  anything  in 
his possession. He was searched and a canister 
marked bear spray was found down the front of his 
pants. When asked why he had the bear spray, the 
accused said he kept it “for protection while on the 
streets.” He was charged with carrying  a concealed 
weapon.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The pressurized canister which was 
clearly marked as “bear spray” was 
entered as an exhibit. The judge, however, 
acquitted the accused because the 
canister of bear spray was empty and an empty 
canister is not a weapon unless it was actually used 
in an attack. Since it was not proven to be a 
weapon, there was no need to decide wether the 
canister of bear spray was “concealed.” The accused 
was acquitted.
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Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The Crown appealed the accused’s 
acquittal. The appeal judge found that 
the trial judge erred in finding  the 
canister was in fact empty. However, he 
ruled that the  Crown had failed to prove the canister 
contained bear spray. “Proving  that [the accused] 
carried bear spray, however, requires more than just 
producing  a  canister labelled ‘bear spray’ and 
assuming  that the contents match the label,” he said. 
“One reasonably may infer that the canister might 
contain bear spray, or perhaps even that it probably 
contains bear spray, but neither a possibility nor a 
probability is sufficient to establish proof beyond a 
reasonable  doubt.” Since the Crown did not 
sufficiently prove that the accused was carrying  bear 
spray, the acquittal was upheld. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown again challenged the 
acquittal by submitting  that the 
appeal judge failed to consider the 
whole  of the evidence and only 
focussed on the canister.  Justice Ryan-Froslie, 
delivering  the Court of Appeal’s opinion, agreed. “In 
determining  guilt or innocence a judge must weigh 
all of the evidence,” she said. “The standard of 
proof, being  beyond a reasonable doubt, is not to be 
applied to individual pieces of evidence. Rather, it is 
to be applied to the evidence as a whole for the 
purpose of determining  whether each of the 
necessary  elements of an offence has been 
established.” She continued:
In this case, the summary conviction appeal 
judge focused solely on the canister and in 
doing  so ignored relevant circumstantial 
evidence which may have supported a finding 
that the canister contained bear spray. In 
addition to the canister itself, that circumstantial 
evidence included the peace officer’s testimony 
that he saw [the accused] stuff something  down 
the front of his pants, that R.B.H. denied two or 
three times that he was hiding anything, that the 
canister was found in the front of [the accused’s] 
pants and that when the peace officer asked [the 
accused] why he had bear spray on him, [the 
accused] replied that he “… keeps it for 
protection while on the streets”. In failing to 
consider all of the evidence the trial judge erred 
in law. [para. 16] 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittal was set aside and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
THEFT	 &	 THREAT	 WERE	 
SEPARATE	 INCIDENTS:	 s.	 343(a)	 
ROBBERY	 NOT	 MADE	 OUT	 
R. v. McKay, 2014 SKCA 19                    
 
The accused entered an off-sale 
establishment, grabbed a bottle of 
whiskey and ran out the  door. A 
shopkeeper chased after him. After 
about 100 metres, the accused turned 
around, pulled a knife  from his pocket and swung  it 
at his pursuer from a distance of about 1.5 metres.  
The accused then verbally threatened the 
shopkeeper to stop  chasing  him. The accused took 
off and the police were called. Officers immediately 
attended the area, found the accused running  from 
the scene and arrested him. A bottle of whiskey and 
a knife were found nearby. The accused provided a 
warned statement admitting  he stole the whiskey, ran 
out of the store with it, had a knife  when he 
threatened the shopkeeper and dropped the knife 
when the police caught him. He was charged with 
robbery under s. 343(a) of the Criminal Code.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The accused argued that the theft of the 
whiskey and the threat he made to the 
shopkeeper were two separate incidents. 
The judge disagreed, finding  the theft 
and the  threat to stab were one  continuous event. 
She held that the threat was made to overcome 
resistance to the theft by encouraging  the pursuer to 
discontinue the chase and enabling  the accused to 
maintain possession of the stolen goods.  Thus, the 
charge of robbery was made out and the accused 
was sentenced to 36 months imprisonment less five 
months of remand time. 
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Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused argued that he should 
only  have been convicted of theft. 
The Crown, on the other hand, 
suggested the theft continued from 
the taking  of the liquor to the threat which was made 
to overcome the resistance to the stealing. 
The Court of Appeal ruled that the theft and threat 
were two separate incidents. The theft was complete 
when the accused took the liquor from the counter 
and before the accused made the threat. The threat 
was made as a  warning  to the shopkeeper to not 
chase anymore. The threat occurred after the theft 
was complete and therefore the robbery conviction 
under s. 343(a) could not stand. “There is no 
evidence the knife was used in the commission of 
the theft and the threat was a distinct transaction 
from the theft,” said Justice Lane. However, a 
conviction for the included offence of theft was 
substituted. Because the Crown chose to proceed 
with robbery under s.343(a)  and not s. 343(b), the 
only appropriate conviction was theft.
The accused’ appeal was allowed, his robbery 
conviction set aside, a conviction for theft under 
$5,000 was entered and he was re-sentenced only to 
time served.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal	 Code: s. 343 (a) v. (b) Robbery
s.343 Every one commits robbery 
who
(a) steals, and for the purpose of 
extorting  whatever is stolen or 
prevent or overcome resistance to 
the stealing, uses violence or 
threats of violence to a person or property;
(b) steals from any person and, at the time he 
steals or immediately before or immediately 
thereafter, wounds, beats, strikes or uses any 
personal violence to that person. 
FACTORS	 VIEWED	 COLLECTIVELY	 
&	 CONTEXTUALLY	 PROVIDE	 
NECESSARY	 GROUNDS
R. v. Wunderlich, 2014 ABCA 94
 
An Alberta police officer stopped the 
accused after seeing  his vehicle cross 
over the fog  line  onto the shoulder of 
a highway. The vehicle also did not 
have mud flaps. As the officer 
approached along  the passenger side, he noticed a 
large dog  that prevented him from engaging  the 
driver. He circled around the back  of the vehicle and 
approached the  driver’s side. As he did so, he 
observed a mattress in the rear box of the truck. 
While the officer spoke to the accused, he made a 
number of other observations that raised his 
suspicions: (1) the vehicle had a  “very lived-in look”; 
(2)  the presence of a mattress and a jerry can 
indicated that the accused did not want to leave the 
vehicle unattended; (3) there were numerous air 
fresheners hanging  from the rear-view mirror, several 
of which were emitting  odour; (4) a large dog  was 
present; (5) the accused said he was travelling  from 
Vancouver to Regina, but the highway travelled was 
not the most direct route for his supposed travel 
plans; (6)  the accused claimed that he planned to go 
hunting  but the officer knew hunting  season was not 
open for non-residents; and (7)  the accused 
appeared to be overly  nervous for a  traffic stop, his 
carotid artery was pulsating  and he became 
increasingly nervous as the stop continued.
 
A computer check revealed the accused had been 
queried two days earlier by the Vancouver police. 
However, he  told the officer that he left Vancouver 
four days earlier and stayed overnight with his sister 
in Kelowna and then stayed the following  night in 
Edmonton. The officer returned to the accused’s 
vehicle and noted that his nervousness had not 
subsided. His face was now flushed. The accused 
then changed his story  about his travel plans, 
indicating  that he was going  to Saskatoon, rather 
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than Regina. This story would be more consistent 
with travelling  the highway he was on. At this point 
the officer formed the suspicion that the accused 
was involved in drug  related activity. He detained 
the accused and deployed his police service dog  to 
sniff around the exterior of the vehicle. The dog 
indicated the presence of narcotics. The accused was 
arrested for possessing  a controlled substance and 
9.5 lbs of marihuana was found when the vehicle 
was searched. 
 
Alberta Provincial Court
 
The accused argued that his rights under 
ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter had been 
violated. But the judge was satisfied that 
the officer had a reasonable suspicion - 
more than a hunch - that the accused was involved 
in a drug-related offence before he was detained and 
before the dog  was deployed to sniff the vehicle. The 
judge recognized that individual pieces of evidence 
may be neutral when viewed in isolation (eg. messy 
or “lived in” appearance, air fresheners, travelling 
with a dog), but the correct test was to look at the 
evidence as a  whole. He also recognized the 
officer’s experience and training  in relation to drug 
investigations. There  were no Charter breaches, the 
evidence was admitted and the accused was 
convicted of possessing  marihuana for the purpose 
of trafficking. 
Alberta Court of Appeal 
 
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
conviction arguing, in part, that the 
trial judge failed to properly 
consider the evidence when 
concluding  there were no ss. 8  or 9 Charter 
breaches. But the Court of Appeal disagreed.
Majority
Justices Watson and Rowbotham found the trial 
judge was alive  to the neutrality of several factors 
cited as evidence to support a reasonable suspicion. 
In their view, however, there were also several 
important non-neutral factors. These included the 
change in the accused’s itinerary to explain why he 
was on the highway and his travel plans were 
inconsistent with the vehicle query in Vancouver. 
The majority ruled that the trial judge adequately 
considered the testimony of the officer and 
explained that, “while some of the individual 
indicators may have been neutral, collectively, in 
context, and with the officer’s training  and 
experience, the factors raised a reasonable suspicion 
that the  [accused] was involved in drug  related 
activity.”
Another View
Justice Berger, concurring  in the result, gave his own 
reasons. In his view, even without the conversation 
between the officer and the accused, “the ‘drug 
investigation profile indicators’ observed by the 
investigating  constable [were] sufficient ... to 
establish the mere ‘possibility’ of criminality to 
warrant the subsequent search.” These included:
1. The presence of a mattress and jerry can in the 
box of the  vehicle “at the time of the year when 
it can be very cold in this part of the world, if 
one was planning  to sleep there.” This was said 
to be consistent with a  drug  courier who would 
be unwilling to leave his vehicle.
2. The numerous air fresheners.
3. The lived-in look of the vehicle, including  the 
multiple fast food containers throughout.
4. The accused’s nervousness which “intensified” 
as evidenced by his pulsating carotid artery.
5. The discovery that the accused’s licence had 
been queried two days earlier in Vancouver.
6. When the officer returned to the vehicle, but 
before the conversation took place, the 
accused’s complexion was now flushed.
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
OOPS
In Volume 14 Issue  1 at page  17 it was reported in 
the headline that “U.S. On-Duty Deaths Increase.” 
This was an error. The number of deaths for on-duty 
officers in the U.S. actually decreased as outlined in 
the article. The headline should have read “U.S. On-
Duty Deaths Decrease.” This is all good news in that 
there  has been significant decreases in on-duty 
deaths over the last several years.
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INTENTION	 TO	 STOP	 AROSE	 ON	 
PUBLIC	 HIGHWAY:	 PRIVATE	 
PROPERTY	 PULLOVER	 LAWFUL
R. v. Anderson, 2014 SKCA 32      
A police officer followed the 
accused’s vehicle in the early 
morning  hours with the intention to 
stop  it and check the driver for his 
licence, registration and sobriety. 
The vehicle, however, turned into a private yard 
where the accused resided. The police  officer 
followed, drove onto the private yard and activated 
his emergency lights to stop the vehicle. The vehicle 
continued in the private yard and eventually came 
to a stop in front of a  large building  at 12:47 am. Up 
to this time the police officer had observed no 
driving  infractions nor any other offences committed 
by the vehicle or its driver. The police officer got out 
of his car and approached the accused’s vehicle. The 
accused complied with a request to produce his 
driver’s licence and vehicle registration. He said he 
had “a couple of beers” when asked about drinking. 
The officer formed a reasonable suspicion that the 
accused had alcohol in his body and demanded a 
breath sample into an approved screening  device 
(ASD) under s. 254 (2)  of the Criminal Code at 
1:02 am. The officer turned on the ASD, explained 
the procedure  while the ASD warmed up  and 
obtained a sample at 1:18  am which registered a 
fail. Immediately thereafter the officer made a breath 
demand under s. 254(3)  of the Criminal Code, gave 
the police warning  and advised the accused of his 
right to counsel, which was declined. The accused 
was taken to a police detachment and subsequently 
provided two breath samples at 2:31  am and 
2:49 am, registering  readings of 170 mg% and 160 
mg%. He was charged with operating  a motor 
vehicle while his blood alcohol level exceeded 80 
mg%.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge found the traffic stop unlawful. 
Since the officer did not attempt to stop 
the accused until he  left the public 
highway and entered onto private 
property, the police lacked the authority  to stop 
under Saskatchewan's Traffic Safety  Act (TSA). Thus, 
the accused’s detention breached s. 9 of the Charter. 
Furthermore, because 31 minutes elapsed from the 
time of the stop  until the ASD demand was made, 
the judge concluded the demand was not made 
“forthwith” as required by s. 254(2). Therefore, the 
officer was required to advise the accused of his 
right to counsel under s. 10(b). The Certificate  of 
Analyses was excluded from evidence and the 
accused was found not guilty of driving  over 80 mg
%.
 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The Crown’s appeal was successful. An 
appeal judge ruled that Saskatchewan's 
TSA permitted a police officer to follow a 
vehicle from a public highway onto 
private property and stop the vehicle to perform a 
random vehicle check, provided the officer had 
formed the  intention to stop  the driver while on a 
public highway. The accused had not been 
arbitrarily detained and his rights under s. 9 had not 
been violated. In addition, the appeal judge found 
that the trial judge erred in law in determining  that 
the ASD demand was not made “forthwith.” In his 
view, “forthwith” did not mean “immediately” and 
the time to consider commenced with the ASD 
demand. The Certificate of Analyses was admitted 
and a conviction was entered.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
The accused then appealed his 
conviction arguing  that the stop 
did breach s. 9 of the Charter 
because the  police lacked the 
requisite authority  to stop  him and that the trial 
judge was correct to conclude that the ASD sample 
was not taken forthwith. 
Vehicle Stop
The accused suggested that TSA did not provide 
statutory authority for the  police to make random 
stops on private property, regardless of whether the 
Stop - 00:47 hrs
Reasonable Suspicion + ASD Demand - 01:02 hrs
ASD Sample Taken - 01:18 hrs
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officer had formed the  intention to check his driver’s 
licence and registration and conduct a  sobriety test 
while he was on a public  highway. The Crown, on 
the other hand, submitted that the officer was 
entitled to pursue the accused’s vehicle because  he 
was already in the process of exercising  an 
important and legitimate  policing  function. In its 
view, the critical point in time to consider was when 
the police officer formed the intention to stop the 
accused’s vehicle, not when he first expressed that 
intention by activating his emergency flashers.
In this case, although the officer did not actually 
activate his emergency lights or otherwise express 
his intention to stop  the accused until he entered 
onto private property, the  accused was driving  on a 
public highway when the officer formed the 
intention to stop it. This was to be distinguished from 
the random stop of a driver who was and always 
remained on private property when observed by 
police. Justice Whitmore, speaking  for the Court of 
Appeal, put it this way:
It is a fact found by the trial judge that the police 
officer formed the intention to stop the [accused] 
prior to the [accused] turning onto private 
property. In my view, the police officer must be 
allowed sufficient flexibility in carrying out his 
duties to complete that lawful activity. 
Interference with the [accused] here was 
minimal and the entry onto private property, to 
complete the check stop, was reasonably 
necessary, having regard to the nature of the 
liberty interfered with and the public purpose 
served by the interference.
To decide otherwise would encourage drivers to 
seek the sanctuary of private roadways if they 
suspected they were about to be stopped by 
police. In the circumstances of this case, where 
a police officer has formed the intention to stop 
a driver on a public highway pursuant to s. 
209.1 of The Traffic Safety Act, the police officer 
is acting  within the statutory authority by 
following the driver onto private property in 
order to complete his investigation. [paras. 
24-25]
BY THE BOOK:
Saskatchewan’s	 Traffic Safety Act
s. 209.1(1) A peace officer may require 
the person in charge of or operating  a 
motor vehicle to stop that vehicle if the 
peace officer:
(a)  is readily identifiable as a peace 
officer; and
(b) is in the lawful execution of his or her duties and 
responsibilities.
(2) A peace officer may, at any time when a driver is 
stopped pursuant to subsection (1):
(a) require the driver to give his or her name, date of 
birth and address;
(b) request information from the driver about whether 
and to what extent the driver consumed, before or 
while driving, alcohol or any drug  or other substance 
that causes the driver to be unable to safely operate a 
vehicle; and
(c) if the peace officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe that the driver has consumed alcohol or a 
drug or another substance that causes the driver to be 
unable to safely operate a vehicle, require the driver 
to undergo a field sobriety test.
(3)  No person in charge of or operating a motor 
vehicle shall, when signalled or requested to stop by 
a peace officer pursuant to subsection (1), fail to 
immediately bring the vehicle to a safe stop.
(4)  No person in charge of or operating a motor 
vehicle shall fail, when requested by a peace officer, 
to comply with the requests of a peace officer 
pursuant to subsection (2).
“[W]here a police officer has formed the 
intention to stop a driver on a public 
highway pursuant to s. 209.1 of The 
Traffic Safety Act, the police officer is 
acting within the statutory authority by 
following the driver onto private property 
in order to complete his investigation.”
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Forthwith
The accused contended that “forthwith” in s. 254(2) 
meant “immediately.” He submitted that the entire 
period from the initial pull over until he was read his 
right to counsel was relevant when determining 
whether his breath sample had been taken 
“forthwith.” As a  result, he argued that his right to 
counsel under s.  10(b)  had been violated. The 
Crown, to the contrary, suggested that “forthwith” 
did not mean “immediately” and that all of the 
circumstances of the case must be considered when 
determining  whether the “forthwith” requirement 
had been complied with. The Crown also argued 
that the delay under s. 254(2)  starts when the officer 
formed a reasonable suspicion that the  driver had 
alcohol in his body, not necessarily when the vehicle 
was stopped. 
Justice Whitmore noted that the Supreme Court of 
Canada has held that “ for thwith” means 
“immediately” (R. v. Woods, 2005 SCC 42), which 
has further been articulated to mean “without 
unreasonable or unjustified delay.” The Court of 
Appeal found the appropriate  time frame to consider 
whether a demand had been made forthwith and 
whether s. 10(b)  had been breached was the time 
commencing  when the officer formed the requisite 
reasonable suspicion:
The so-called “forthwith window,” being the 
time within which the police officer must require 
a driver to provide a breath sample, in my view, 
does not commence prior to the time when a 
police officer develops a reasonable suspicion 
that the accused had alcohol in his body, as the 
trial judge effectively held. Nor does it begin 
with the ASD demand, as the summary 
conviction appeal judge held. Rather, it begins 
when the police officer develops a reasonable 
suspicion that the accused has alcohol in their 
body. [para. 31]
Here, the accused’s admission to having  consumed 
alcohol came shortly before the ASD demand was 
made, not immediately after the stop. Thus, the 
delay to assess for reasonableness was not 31 
minutes, as found by the trial judge, but rather 16 
minutes. In this case, the 16  minute delay was 
attributed to the operational requirements of the 
testing (readying the equipment):
[T]he police officer is to be afforded reasonable 
time to ready the ASD. There is no evidence 
before the Court of how much time is usually 
required for an ASD to warm up and become 
operational. However, the trial judge found no 
fault in the ASD taking 16 minutes to warm 
up ...
In my view, the 16 minutes it took for the ASD to 
warm up and become operational was 
reasonable and did not offend the “forthwith” 
requirement in s. 254(2) of the Code. [paras. 
39-40] 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
SEATBELT	 OFFENCE	 ONE	 OF	 
STRICT	 LIABILITY
R. v. Wilson, 2014 ONCA 212
While conducting  spot checks, a 
police officer standing  near a corner 
watched the accused stop  his 
vehicle at a stop  sign. The officer 
noticed that the  accused’s seatbelt 
was hanging  by  his shoulder. The officer directed the 
accused to pull over and then issued him a 
Provincial Offences Notice for failing  to wear a 
seatbelt contrary to s. 106(2) of Ontario’s Highway 
Traffic Act (HTA)
Justice of the Peace
At his trial the accused said he  had placed 
a coffee  in a cup holder in the backseat of 
his car. While driving, he noticed the 
coffee was spilling  on his laptop. When 
the officer observed him, he had just pulled up  to a 
stop  sign and removed his seatbelt so he could 
straighten the coffee cup. He said there was no other 
traffic around at the time and he intended to put his 
seatbelt back on as soon as he adjusted the coffee 
cup. The Justice of the Peace held that failing  to wear 
a seatbelt was an absolute liability  offence and 
convicted the accused.
“The so-called “forthwith window”  ... 
begins when the police officer develops a 
reasonable suspicion that the accused has 
alcohol in their body.” 
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Ontario Court of Justice
The accused appealed his conviction 
arguing, among  other grounds, that the 
offence for a driver failing  to wear a 
seatbelt was one of strict, rather than 
absolute liability. The judge ruled in favour of the 
accused and concluded that failing  to wear a 
seatbelt was a strict liability offence affording  him a 
due diligence offence. A new trial was ordered. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
A strict liability offence lies 
“between the extremes of true 
criminal offences that require proof 
of a guilty state of mind (intention, 
knowledge or recklessness)  and public welfare 
offences imposing  absolute liability, where 
conviction will follow upon proof that the  accused 
did the prohibited act with no consideration of the 
accused’s state  of mind or degree of fault.” With a 
strict liability offence, the prosecution makes out its 
case  by proving  the doing  of the prohibited act, but 
the accused may avoid conviction by proving  on a 
balance of probabilities that they took reasonable 
care to avoid the prohibited act.
In most cases, Ontario’s HTA does not clearly 
specify the level of fault required. The courts are 
then left with the task of determining  which of the 
three  categories an offence falls within. In this case, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal found the offence of a 
driver failing  to wear a seatbelt under s. 106(2)  was 
one of strict liability. There  was nothing  in the way 
the offence was defined to displace the strong 
presumption of strict liability as articulated in R. v. 
Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 where the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that “punishment 
should in general not be inflicted on those without 
fault.” Furthermore:
1. s. 106  is a  detailed statutory scheme regarding 
seatbelts and does not specify the level of fault 
required. 
2. “[I]t is not impossible to imagine situations 
where  a driver finds him or herself not securely 
seat belted despite having  taken reasonable 
steps to secure the belt.” 
3. Just because a s. 106(2)  offence involves a 
simple  act entirely within the control of the 
driver, it is quite possible that a driver could 
take reasonable steps to fasten his or her seat 
belt only to find that the belt did not close 
properly or had come undone. Although the 
defence of due diligence will be rare, the small 
chance of success should not deprive the driver 
of the opportunity to present it. 
4. The presence of statutory exceptions to wearing 
a seatbelt - driving  in reverse, medical reasons 
or work-related need - did not have any bearing 
on the classification of the offence. “The 
exceptions exclude the prosecution of certain 
individuals who have very specific needs and 
reasons not to wear a seat belt,” said Justice 
Sharpe. “The exceptions neither arise from nor 
relate to the concept of due diligence.” 
BY THE BOOK:
Ontario’s	 Highway Traffic Act
Use of seat belt assembly by driver
s. 106 (2)   Every person who drives on a 
highway a motor vehicle in which a seat 
belt assembly is provided for the driver 
shall wear the complete seat belt 
assembly as required by subsection (5).
How to wear seat belt assembly
(5)  A seat belt assembly shall be worn so that,
(a) the pelvic restraint is worn firmly against the 
body and across the hips;
(b) the torso restraint, if there is one, is worn 
closely against the body and over the shoulder 
and across the chest;
(c) the pelvic restraint, and the torso restraint, if 
there is one, are securely fastened; and
(d) no more than one person is wearing  the seat 
belt assembly at any one time. 
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In conclusion, the Court of Appeal noted that a due 
diligence defence will not be established by acting 
generally in a reasonable way. Rather, “a defence of 
due diligence to this charge would only be made out 
where, although the driver was found not wearing 
his or her seat belt when driving, the driver had 
taken all reasonable care to wear the seat belt.”  
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Additional case facts taken from R. v. 
Wilson, 2013 ONCJ 313
REASONABLE	 GROUNDS	 TO	 BE	 
ASSESSED	 AT	 TIME	 OF	 ARREST
R. v. Day, 2014 NLCA 14
 
A police investigator received a  tip 
from a reliable informant that the 
accused and his roommate possessed 
quantities of marihuana, cocaine and 
steroids for sale.  The same day the 
investigator corroborated some of the tip’s details, 
including  the accused’s and his roommate's address, 
the vehicles they drove and the roommate’s 
involvement in selling  drugs.  The investigator also 
learned that a year earlier the accused had been 
found in possession of what was believed to be 
marihuana and a set of digital scales, though he had 
not been charged at that time. The accused’s 
residence was placed under surveillance by police 
and he was seen leaving  it and driving  off in a black 
Honda Civic at 3:25 pm, a vehicle the investigator 
was informed he would be driving. After the accused 
stopped at a  convenience store, a  man came out of 
the store and got into the accused’s car. The officers 
were unable to see what happened in the car or 
when exactly the man got out of it, but they saw the 
car drive away and followed it. The accused parked 
it and then entered a downtown bar.
Meanwhile, the investigator appeared before a 
judge, obtained a search warrant at 4:00 pm and let 
the surveillance officers know. About half an hour 
later, the surveillance officers observed the accused 
exit the bar with two women and walk  to the Honda 
Civic that was parked nearby. When the  accused got 
into the driver’s seat and started the car he was 
confronted by police and arrested for trafficking. The 
women were advised that they could leave and did 
so. A search of the accused’s person yielded two cell 
phones and some cash. He was cautioned, informed 
of his Charter  rights and placed in the  police  car.  
When the police searched his car they found a small 
quantity  of marihuana, a bud buster and a used 
marihuana pipe. Two zip lock bags, each containing 
one-half pound of marihuana, were found in the 
trunk.  The accused was charged with possessing 
marihuana for the purpose of trafficking.
Newfoundland Provincial Court
During  testimony the investigator said he 
waited for the warrant to issue before 
arresting  the accused because he wanted 
to minimize the risk that the arrest could 
prompt contact with someone at the residence and 
result in the destruction of evidence. On cross-
examination the investigator did not want to 
speculate as to what he would have done had the 
search warrant not been issued.The judge found that 
the accused’s arrest was unlawful and that his 
Charter rights to be free from arbitrary detention (s. 
9)  and unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8) had 
been breached.  In the judge’s view, the police did 
not have the requisite subjective belief for arresting 
the accused because the  officer could not say 
whether he would have ordered the arrest if the 
search warrant had not been issued. As well, the 
judge found that a reasonable person placed in the 
position of the police would not be able to conclude 
that there were  reasonable grounds for the arrest. 
She excluded the marihuana, cell phones and drug 
paraphernalia from evidence under s. 24(2) of the 
Charter. As a result, the accused was acquitted.
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the accused’s 
acquittal on the basis that the trial 
judge erred in ruling  that the arrest 
was unlawful and that ss. 8 and 9 of 
the Charter were breached. In the Crown’s opinion, 
the investigating  officer ordering  the arrest had the 
necessary  subjective belief that the accused was 
committing  or was about to commit a drug 
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trafficking  offence and that this belief was justifiable 
from an objective point of view. Furthermore, the 
Crown contended that even if the accused’s Charter 
rights were breached the judge erred in excluding 
the marihuana, cell phones and drug  paraphernalia 
as evidence.  
Arrest
Justice Hoegg, authoring  a majority judgment, first 
noted that “the reasonable grounds for arresting  a 
person without a warrant encompass both 1)  a 
subjective belief on the part of the police that the 
person has committed or is about to commit an 
indictable offence, and 2) that the subjective belief 
must be ‘justifiable from an objective point of 
view’.” 
Subjective Belief
The majority concluded that the officer had the 
requisite subjective belief. At no time did the  officer 
say his grounds for arrest depended on the warrant 
being  issued nor was there any evidence that his 
belief hinged on such a case. Justice Hoegg stated:
[I]t is worth observing that a decision to arrest 
can involve more than simply having the 
requisite grounds.  The fact 
that the officer may not 
have arrested [the accused] 
had the warrant not been 
issued does not mean that 
the officer’s subjective belief 
was vitiated, or that his 
g r o u n d s w e r e n o t 
objectively justifiable.  The 
p o l i c e m a y h a v e a 
subjective belief that is 
objectively justifiable to arrest a person whom 
they choose not to arrest, and the fact that the 
arrest is not carried out does not mean that the 
police do not have the grounds. [para. 25]
The investigator’s subjective belief for the arrest was 
what he personally believed at the time it was 
made. What the investigator’s belief might have been 
in a different set of circumstances was irrelevant to 
what he believed at that time. Here, the judge 
focussed on the investigator’s answers to 
hypothetical questions respecting  the warrant not 
being  issued.  Since there was no evidence linking 
the investigator’s belief in grounds for arrest to the 
warrant being  issued, the evidence respecting  the 
hypotheticals was irrelevant.  It was an error in law 
for the trial judge to not state and apply the proper 
legal standard. She was required to consider only 
the relevant evidence respecting  the investigator’s 
subjective belief. Had she done so, the trial judge 
would have determined that the investigator had the 
requisite subjective belief.  Furthermore, the trial 
judge also made a palpable and overriding  error by 
inferring  that the investigator lacked a subjective 
belief from his hesitation to answer a hypothetical 
question had the warrant not been issued. 
Objective Grounds
Justice Hoegg  found the trial judge also erred in 
concluding  the objective test for reasonable grounds 
had not been met.  The informant was very reliable, 
provided information from first hand knowledge and 
some of the details - like the accused’s address and 
type of vehicle he drove - were verified. In addition, 
there  was independently verified information that 
the accused had been involved with drugs on a prior 
occasion. Had the trial judge properly considered 
the correct legal principles, she would have 
concluded, in the totality of 
the circumstances, that the 
grounds for arresting  the 
accused were objectively 
justifiable. “The tip  itself 
provided detail beyond a 
bald conclusionary statement 
that [ the accused] was 
trafficking  in drugs, some of 
t h e d e t a i l s w e r e 
corroborated, the reliability  of Source B was very 
high and his or her source was first hand, and 
additional investigation and surveillance served to 
support the belief in grounds,” said Justice Hoegg. 
Since both the subjective and objective prongs of the 
reasonable grounds test had been met, the accused’s 
arrest was lawful and he was, therefore, not 
arbitrarily detained under s. 9 of the Charter.
“The police may have a subjective 
belief that is objectively justifiable to 
arrest a person whom they choose not 
to arrest, and the fact that the arrest 
is not carried out does not mean that 
the police do not have the grounds.”
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The Search
Under the common law doctrine of search incident 
to arrest, the police may search without a warrant 
provided (1) the arrest was lawful, (2) the search was 
conducted incident to the arrest for a  valid purpose, 
and 3)  the manner in which the search was carried 
out was reasonable. Valid purposes for conducting 
searches incident to arrest include protecting  the 
police and protecting  and discovering  evidence 
related to the arrest.
In this case, the police searched the accused and his 
car for the purpose of discovering  evidence, a valid 
reason for searching  incident to arrest. Furthermore, 
the public manner of the search did not taint its 
reasonableness. Justice Hoegg stated:
In my view, the time and place of the search 
were called for in the circumstances. There was 
nothing abusive about the search of [the 
accused] and nothing  done to him or in the 
searching  of his car that could lead to the 
conclusion that the search was carried out in an 
unreasonable manner.   While respect for the 
privacy and dignity of accused persons is always 
called for, the police cannot be expected to 
conduct their work at times and places which 
are optimal from the point of view of persons 
involved in investigations. Accordingly, I 
conclude that the search was carried out in a 
reasonable manner.
The searches of the accused and his car were 
lawfully conducted incident to his arrest, and there 
was no s. 8 Charter breach.  The marihuana, cell 
phones and drug  paraphernalia were admissible as 
evidence. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered.
 
A Different View
Justice Rowe, in dissent, concluded that 
the arresting  officer did not believe he 
had reasonable grounds independent of 
the search warrant being  granted. Instead, 
he believed he had grounds, in part, because the 
search warrant had been granted. Since the arresting 
officer couldn’t say whether he would have had 
grounds to make the arrest in the absence of the 
search warrant, then the subjective prong  of the test 
had not been made out. The  inference the trial judge 
drew that the arresting  officer did not subjectively 
have reasonable grounds for the arrest was logical.
 
As for the objective test, it too had not been met. 
Since the arrest was arbitrary  and unlawful, a search 
incidental to such an arrest would also be unlawful. 
“The arrest of [the accused] was a clear abuse of 
authority, one that warrants censure by the courts,” 
said Justice Rowe. The evidence was properly 
excluded according  to Justice Rowe and he would 
have dismissed the Crown’s appeal. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ACCUSED	 MUST	 PROVE	 
‘REASONABLE	 EXCUSE’	 FOR	 
REFUSING	 BREATH	 SAMPLE
R. v. Goleski, 2014 BCCA 80
After seeing  a truck fail to stop at 
two stop  signs and speed 25 km/h 
over the posted speed limit, the 
police pulled it over. The officer 
detected the odour of alcohol on the 
accused’s breath. He also said “he had had a  few 
drinks” when asked about drinking.  An approved 
screening  device (ASD) demand was made and a 
“fail” registered. The breathalyzer demand then 
followed and the accused was advised of his right to 
counsel. He said he would comply  with the demand 
and that he  did not want to speak with a lawyer. He 
was driven to the police detachment where he then 
twice refused to provide  samples of his breath. He 
was charged with refusing  to provide a  breath 
sample.
British Columbia Provincial Court
At his trial the accused testified that the 
officer had lied about him not stopping  at 
both stop  signs. His sober passenger also 
supported his story that he had stopped. 
He said he deliberately refused the breath sample 
because  he felt the officer was unfair and dishonest, 
and could not be trusted in accurately  recording  the 
breathalyzer results. The judge ruled that the onus 
was on the accused to establish a reasonable  excuse 
on a balance of probabilities, which he failed to do. 
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BRI T ISH C O L U M BI A  
L A W E N F O R C E M E N T M E M O RI A L 
C O L L E C T O R C O IN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coins are $10 each 
 
Net proceeds will be donated to: 
British Columbia Law Enforcement Memorial Foundation 
& 
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The front of the coin depicts a Federal 
and Municipal officer standing post at the 
B ritish Columbia Law Enforcement 
Memorial Bastion located on the grounds 
of the Provincial Legislature in V ictoria; 
with the flag of British Columbia in the 
background. 
The back of the coin depicts officers from 
Federal, Provincial and Municipal 
agencies fir ing a rifle salute with the 
Memorial Ribbon in the background. The 
phrase around the border is etched into 
the Bastion. 
The judge found all the witnesses 
credible, could not decide who to believe 
and therefore found the evidence failed 
to establish that is was more likely than 
not that the officer was lying. The 
accused was convicted of refusing  to 
provide a  breath sample. The judge 
noted, however, that had the onus been 
on the accused to merely  raise a 
reasonable doubt about whether he  had a 
reasonable excuse for refusing  then such 
a standard had been met.   
British Columbia Supreme Court
The appeal judge set aside the 
accused’s conviction and 
entered an acquittal. In his 
view, the trial judge erred in 
placing  the burden on the accused to 
p rove  a  r easonab le excuse . He 
concluded that the accused only need 
raise  the question of the possibility of a 
reasonable excuse. Then the Crown must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
lack of a reasonable excuse. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed 
arguing  that when an 
accused asserts they had 
a reasonable excuse for 
failing  or refusing  to comply  with a 
breath demand, the accused must prove 
it on a balance of probabilities. In the 
Crown’s submission, it did not have to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
absence  of a reasonable excuse. The 
Court of Appeal agreed. Under s. 794(2) 
of the Criminal Code, an accused who 
asserts that they had a reasonable excuse 
for failing  or refusing  to comply with a 
breathalyzer demand must prove the 
factual foundation for their excuse on a 
balance of probabilities. It is not enough 
for an accused to simply raise  the issue of 
a reasonable excuse. The accused’s 
conviction was reinstated.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Proclamation Declaring the last Sunday in 
September of each year to be “Police and Peace 
Officers’ National Memorial Day”
SI/98-97
... ... ...
Whereas Canadian police and peace officers make valuable 
contributions to the safety  of Canadians and it is considered appropriate 
that there be, in each year, a day  to mark and pay tribute to the hard 
work, dedication and sacrifices made by  Canadian police and peace 
officers;
Whereas memorial services are held in communities across the country 
on the last Sunday of September of every year to commemorate those 
police and peace officers who were killed in the line of duty;
And whereas, by  Order in Council ... His Excellency the Governor 
General in Council has directed that a proclamation do issue declaring 
the last Sunday  in September of each year to be “Police and Peace 
Officers’ National Memorial Day”...
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SUPREME	 COURT	 DECIDES	 
CASES	 QUICKER
In its report  “Supreme Court of 
Canada - Statistics 2003 to 
2013” the workload of Canada’s 
highest Court was outlined. In 
2013  the Supreme Court heard 
75 appeals, down from 78  in 
2012. The most appeals heard 
annually in the last 10 years 
was in 2005 when 93  were 
brought before the Court. The 
lowest number of appeals heard 
in a single year during  the last decade was 53 in 
2007.
Case Life Span 
The time it takes for the Court to render a judgment 
from the date  it hears a case dipped slightly to 6.2 
months from 6.3  months in 2012. Overall it took 
17.7 months, on average, for the court to render an 
opinion from the time an application for leave to 
hear a case is filed. This is down from the previous 
year (19.3 months). The shortest time within the last 
10 years for the Court to announce its decision after 
hearing  arguments was 4.0 months in 2004 while 
the longest time was 7.7 months in 2010. 
Applications for Leave 
In 2013 there were 529 applications for leave to 
appeal the decision of a lower court, meaning  a 
party  sought permission for a hearing  from a three 
judge panel. Quebec was the source of most 
applications for leave at 152 cases. This was 
followed by Ontario (135), British Columbia (76), 
the Federal Court of Appeal (54), Alberta (52), 
Saskatchewan (18), Nova Scotia (14), Manitoba (11) 
Newfoundland and Labrador (7), New Brunswick (6)
Prince Edward Island (3)  and the Northwest 
Territories (1). No applications for leave came from 
Nunavut or the Yukon. Of the 529 leave 
applications, 46 or 9% were granted while 57 were 
pending. Of all applications for leave, 26% were 
criminal and 74% were civil.
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Appeals Heard 
Of the 75 appeals heard in 2013, Quebec had the 
most of any origin at 18. This was followed by 
Ontario with 13, British Columbia (12), the Federal 
Court of Appeal, Alberta and Nova Scotia (7 each), 
Newfoundland and Labrador (5), Saskatchewan (3), 
New Brunswick, Manitoba and Canada, each with 
one. No appeals originated from the Northwest 
Territories, Prince Edward Island, Yukon or Nunavut. 
Of the appeals heard in 2013, 
5 3 % w e r e c iv i l wh i l e t h e 
remaining  47% were criminal. 
Twenty percent (20%) of the 
criminal cases dealt with Charter 
issues, up from 10% in 2012. 
Twelve (12)  of the appeals heard in 2013  were as of 
right. This source  of appeal includes cases where 
there  is a  dissent on a point of law in a provincial 
court of appeal. 
The remaining 63 cases had leave to appeal granted. 
Appeal Judgments 
There were 78 appeal judgments released in 2013, 
down from 83  the previous year. Only nine 
decisions were delivered from the bench last year 
while the remaining  69 were 
d e l i v e r e d a f t e r b e i n g 
reserved. Thirty-nine (39) 
appeals were allowed while 
39 were dismissed. In terms 
of unanimity, the Supreme 
Court agreed on 68% of its 
cases. This is down slightly 
from 72% the previous year. 
For the remaining  32% of its judgments released in 
2013 the Court was split.  
Source: www.scc-csc.gc.ca
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NEW	 DEGREE	 ADDRESSES	 
GROWING	 COMPLEXITY	 IN	 
POLICING
The Justice  Institute of British Columbia (JIBC)  is 
accepting  applications for its new Bachelor	 of	 
Law	 Enforcement	 Studies (BLES) program that 
gives prospective recruits a competitive  edge by 
providing  the complex skills needed in today’s 
police officers.
“The program is the first of its kind in Western 
Canada,” said Mike Trump, Dean of the  School of 
Criminal Justice and Security at the JIBC. “It was 
developed to provide the latest techniques and 
necessary skills to deal with the growing 
sophistication of crime and the increasing 
complexity of policing.”
One only has to look at some recent cases in B.C. 
like the 2011 Stanley Cup Riot to discover how 
complex policing  has become. The Integrated Riot 
Investigation Team, made up  of members from the 
Lower Mainland’s police forces, forensically 
processed more than 5,000 hours of video and 
thousands of individual photos to identify  and 
charge nearly 300 suspected rioters to date. 
“Forensically processing  evidence involves knowing 
how to protect evidence from contamination and to 
ensure  that any collection of evidence will withstand 
the most stringent criminal court proceedings,” said 
Steve McCartney, coordinator for the Law 
Enforcement Studies Diploma and the Bachelor of 
Law Enforcement Studies. 
“Policing  today is more complex on so many 
different levels. It’s no longer just responding  to 
calls,” he said. “Police  officers today have to know 
how to comprehend massive amounts of information 
and they need to know how to write and organize 
reports and affidavits that are  necessary to secure 
charges.”
Learning  how to properly conduct forensic 
investigations, handle firearms, and drive emergency 
vehicles are just some of the essential skills 
prospective police recruits learn through JIBC’s law 
enforcement program. It begins with a two-year Law	 
Enforcement	 Studies	 Diploma (LESD), which 
can ladder into the BLES program. 
Graduates of the LESD program and students from 
other post-secondary  institutions with a criminal 
justice or criminology diploma are invited to apply 
for the new bachelor’s degree. If they meet the 
admission requirements, their credits can be 
transferred and students can continue  their 
education in the third year of the BLES program.
Third and fourth year courses develop  a candidate’s 
leadership, critical thinking  and ethical decision-
making  skills and provides a background in areas 
including  business, human resources, research and 
labour law issues.
McCartney noted that more than half of the recruits 
hired by local police departments and trained at 
B.C.’s Police Academy have a bachelor’s degree. 
“Completion of the degree provides a  competitive 
edge for people looking to be hired as police 
officers, sheriffs, correctional officers, and a 
number of other law enforcement careers,” said 
McCartney. “It also provides career flexibility by 
providing the skills and knowledge needed in a 
wide range of other public safety professions.”
The application deadline for the Bachelor	 of	 Law	 
Enforcement	 Studies is April 30, 2014. 
For more information, visit www.jibc.ca/bles or send 
an email to bles@jibc.ca.  
About the Justice Institute of British Columbia
The Justice Institute of British Columbia is Canada’s 
leading  public safety educator. Their specialized 
programs lead to certificates, diplomas, bachelor’s 
degrees and graduate certificates in Policing, 
Investigations, Emergency Management, Firefighting, 
Paramedicine, Sheriffs, Corrections, Counselling, 
Leadership, Mediation, Conflict Resolution, and Driver 
Training. The JIBC also provides customized contract 
training  to domestic and international governments, 
agencies and organizations. Their approach to 
education emphasizes applied learning  and realistic 
simulations, delivered by instructors who are 
experienced practitioners. Each year, approximately 
30,000 students study at the JIBC. Their work makes 
communities safer, and helps people in need, 
throughout B.C., across Canada and around the world.
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BACHELOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDIES
BACHELOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
Expand your academic credentials and enhance your career options.  
Gain the theoretical background, applied skills and specialized 
knowledge for a career in public safety.
keeping communities safe
enforcing the law
on the front line
Apply today. JIBC.ca 604.528.5590    register@jibc.ca  
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
Be the one
15-007
Online Graduate  
Certi!cate Programs
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Expand your credentials and advance your career with 
these online graduate certi!cates. Learn through real world 
challenges, current cases, curriculum and techniques. 
Gain the specialized theoretical foundation and applied skills 
to function successfully as an analyst.
604.528.5843 JIBC.ca/graduatestudies
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
